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Abstract Trust is a good approach to explain the functioning of markets, institutions or
society as a whole. It is a key element in almost every commercial transaction over time and
might be one of the main explanations of economic success and development. Trust
diminishes the more we perceive others to have economically different living realities. In
most of the relevant contributions, scholars have taken amacro perspective on the inequality-
trust linkage, with an aggregation of both trust and inequality on a country level. However,
patterns of within-country inequality and possibly influential determinants, such as per-
ception and socioeconomic reference, remained undetected. This paper offers the opportu-
nity to look at the interplay between inequality and trust at a more refined level. Ameasure of
(generalized) trust emerges from ESS 5 survey which asks ‘‘...generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’’.
With the use of 2009 EU-SILC data, measurements of income inequality are developed for
age-specific groups of society in 22 countries. A sizable variation in inequality measures can
be noticed. Even in low inequality countries, like Sweden, income imbalances within certain
age groups have the potential to undermine social trust.
Keywords Income inequality  Trust  Stratification  Perception
1 Introduction
The undesirable outcomes linked to high levels of income inequality1 are numerous.
Among several, there are poor educational performance (Kawachi et al. 1997), violence
(Patterson 1991), low levels of wellbeing (Alesina et al. 2004) and health (Wilkinson
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2006), as well as slow economic growth (Barro 2000) or low provision rates of social
goods (Pickett and Wilkinson 2009). It is argued that income inequality has a destructive
effect on civic cooperation, since economic stratification leads to low levels of trust
(Pickett and Wilkinson 2009). In addition, it has been shown that social trust is indeed
negatively affected by income inequality (Leigh 2006b; Uslaner and Brown 2005; Gus-
tavsson and Jordahl 2008). Inequality is believed to reduce (generalized) trust since it
stratifies society into distinct groups which are unable to associate with each other any-
more. The link between inequality and trust has so far been examined mainly by looking at
stratification and the society as a whole.
The radius of our social interactions, however, has been shown to be a very relevant in
howmuch we trust others (Knack and Keefer 1997; Delhey et al. 2011). This study therefore
argues that perception of inequality is mainly made by socio-economic benchmarking. Age-
and education-specific measures of income inequality are calculated with the use of Euro-
pean income data. Together with individual characteristics, the inequality measures are
combined in a multilevel ordered logit model in order to better explain patterns of gener-
alized trust. General income inequality might not capture the age-specific imbalances. By
national Gini, Sweden, for example, has one of the lowest levels of income inequality in
Europe. However, income imbalances for the five oldest age cohorts (75–80 years-old) reach
a level of 0.33, which is just about the average of national inequality in Europe.
The results of the study illustrate that income imbalances within European societies
vary to a sizable extent across age and education. In some high inequality countries, like
Bulgaria or Portugal, inequality volatility across age is particularly large. At the same time
we see that age-specific income inequality, just as ‘‘standard’’ inequality is related nega-
tively to trust, controlling for relevant personal characteristics. Generalized trust decreases
with high levels of general and age-specific income inequality. The refinement of income
inequality for different age-groups does not challenge the inequality-trust linkage, but it
adds more explanatory power compared to the use of general income inequality. The
results show that some of the variation of generalized trust is captured by the variance of
income inequality across age. Age-specific inequality is rather a complement than a sub-
stitute to national inequality. The interaction between general income inequality and age-
specific inequality shows a negative association with trust, too. This could be explained by
the idea that age-specific inequality matters even more if observed in an environment of
overall high levels of inequality. Though, a direction of causality, from inequality to trust,
is assumed in this work. An opposite direction of cause and effect could be immagined in
some circumstances. In order to approach the question of causality, future research should
include a longditudinal dimension.
The next section discusses the theoretical concepts of trust and inequality relevant to the
analysis. Sections 3 and 4 of this work present the data and the method, used to entangle
relations between age-specific inequality and trust. Section 5 summarizes the results and
Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Trust and Inequality
2.1 About Generalized Trust
In order to capture the concept of social or interpersonal trust, the generalized trust
question—as applied in this study—has become the most commonly used approximation in
F. Stephany
123
empirical analyses. The use of one single survey question in order to picture trust has been
criticized and even Putnam (1995), strongly convinced of the importance of trust for social
capital has expressed his displeasure about the problem: ‘‘since trust is so central to the
theory of social capital, it would be desirable to have strong behavioral indicators of trends
in social trust or misanthropy. I have discovered no such behavioral measures.’’
The most common criticism to the generalized trust question, which asks for the trust in
most people addresses its vague, abstract, and subjective character. It is argued that the
term most people might be interpreted quite differently from individual to individual. The
idea to whom or which group of people one refers when asked about generalized trust is
known in the literature as the radius problem. What is the radius of social interactions to
which those most people belong to? Surely, as interpersonal trust, like human intelligence
for example, is a non-tangible concept, approaches to make it measurable will always have
to face some shortcomings. The following considerations should underline why the gen-
eralized trust question is a valid choice when it comes to catch hold of interpersonal trust.
Delhey et al. (2011) have shown that people distinguish at least in two different set of
social interactions and therefore two distinct groups of trust, in-group and out-group trust.
In their cross country analysis, they state that most people in standard questions most
commonly refer to out-groups. They acknowledge the subjectivity of the radius of most
people, but point out that the variation is driven by cultural differences rather than by
individual perception. The radius is quite narrow in Confucian countries, wider in wealthy
countries, and—in this particular case—relatively comparable across European societies.
In addition, Knack and Keefer (1997), argue that the actual strength of the generalized
trust question lies in its ambiguity. Since it potentially includes a large radius of indi-
viduals—not only friends and family members—the generalized trust question mixes two
different concepts. On the one hand, how much one trusts in people who are not friends and
relatives, and, on the other hand, how often an individual encounters with such persons. In
low-trust environments, transaction with close friends and family members is much more
common than in high-trust environments. If the respondents to the most people question
consider the individuals they interact with, the variation of the trust measure should be
reduced, which makes it a more reliable measure in explaining potential outcomes like
growth or civic participation. In their empirical analysis, the centered pattern of general-
ized trust is confirmed.
Lastly, a study by Glaeser et al. (2000) with the promising title ‘‘Measuring Trust’’
defends the validity of the generalized trust measure by comparing it with trust and
trustworthiness items from two experiments. Generalized trust—stemming from the con-
troversial question—is shown to be a very good predictor for trusting behaviour in the
experiments. Furthermore, the researchers point out that in their experiments the answer to
the generalized trust question could actually be interpreted as a signal for the own level of
trustworthiness and not so much as a representation of mutual confidence in others.
2.2 Stratification and Perception
The essential argument why inequality reduces generalized trust is that differences
between individuals are too large to trust each other. Two major lines of reasoning are
relevant in this respect. On the one hand, scholars like Tumin (1953) have shown that
generalized trust diminishes the more economically stratified a society is. Distinct spheres
of everyday life emerge (segregated housing, public versus private schooling etc.) within
which understanding and trust for ‘‘outsiders’’ fade away. This association is described as
the stratification effect. On the other hand, claims have been made (Brockner 1996) that
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perceptions and believes about the distribution of resources and how they should ideally be
allocated determine our trust in others by the mechanism of the so-called perception effect
(Uslaner and Brown 2005). Previous studies have claimed to capture the effects of both
stratification and perception with the use of one inequality indicator. If one believes that
the comparison with others is key to understand how inequality influences trust, the
concept of economic reference groups should be described accordingly. Instead to com-
paring one’s own economic well-being to the rest of the society, it is much more likely,
that we chose a reference group to which a meaningful comparison is possible, in the first
place. For an evaluation of the perception effect of inequality, ‘‘our family Jones’’,2 to use
the term of social class benchmarking, still needs to be defined.
2.3 The Inequality Within
The inequality-trust linkage has so far been examined only by looking at stratification and
the society as a whole, while it can be assumed that personal characteristics, as age and
education, play an important role in the deeper understanding of how income distributions
are associated with generalized trust, for mainly two reasons. First, our understanding of
justice strongly determines to what extent inequality might affect our trust. At the same
time, our views on equity and justice change with experience and education during the life
course. In addition, it can be questioned that the extent to which we are exposed to an
assumed stratification effect is the same in all stages of our life. The degree of interaction
with individuals from other social groups might be different for a student compared to a
senior employee or a pensioner. It is therefore necessary to claim that the association
between inequality and trust changes as we age and gain knowledge. Second, scholars
advocating the perception effect have rarely specified the corresponding reference group. If
personal frustration about unjust allocation and distribution of economic resources influ-
ences our level of trust (Pickett and Wilkinson 2009), then the question arises to whom we
actually compare ourselves. A 20 year-old student would perceive the economic success of
a 40 year-old manager rather as something aspiring than something unjust. One probable
assumption is that the perception of inequality within our age-specific socio-economic
reference groups strongly determines our level of generalized trust.
2.4 Life-Cycle Inequality
Only in most recent efforts, attention has been drawn to the shortcomings of comparing
income and wealth of individuals in different stages of their life-cycle and economic
career, such as in Bo¨nke et al. (2011). The authors show that earnings distributions for
German men vary substantially during their life course. Their research on lifetime
inequality, in the example of Germany, has shown that earnings inequality develops in a
U-shaped pattern over age. Inequality is relatively high for cohorts below the age of
twenty, because many have not yet entered the labour market. After that, inequality
declines to a minimum level, which is located around the age of thirty. In the following
period rising inequality of annual earnings begins. At the age of sixty and above the
income distribution has reached the same level of Gini, as the distribution of the 20-years
2 In English-speaking countries ‘‘Keeping up with the Joneses’’ is an idiom for a comparison to one’s
neighbours as a social class benchmark. It has been adapted by economic literature in order to describe
socio-economic referencing.
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old. In accordance with this known pattern of income inequality over age, the assembly of
distinct age-specific Gini indexes is advisable.
2.5 Perception Matters
‘‘Between a condition of objective inequality and the response of a disadvantaged
person lie the perceptions, evaluations, expectations—in short, the psyche—of the
individual.’’
This quote by Dahl (1971, 95) well summarizes the relevance of subjectivity in the
analyses of inequality studies in general. The need of a multi-dimensional measure of
inequality becomes evident once we consider the theoretical relationship between
inequality and trust. One of the main arguments for the inequality-trust-linkage is that
with rising imbalances in economic resources, people do not perceive to share a common
fate or meet the same challenges in life. Osberg and Smeeding (2006), in this context, refer
to the fact that inequality perception does not necessarily mirror actual inequalities, since
individuals do not dispose over the information about the entire income distribution. They
rely on various sources, like the media, political agendas, and most importantly, one might
say, the comparison of the own standard of living with others.
Conditions linked to generalized trust can be influenced by people’s perception of
inequality. Pickett and Wilkinson (2009), for example, suggest that inequality results in
jealousy and envy by the less fortunate. To which extent we have optimism in the future,
which is indeed important for trust (Delhey and Newton 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner
2005), might be harmed by high perceived inequality. Other scholars (Uslaner 2002;
Gustavsson and Jordahl 2008), have argued that safeguards of trust, like egalitarian values,
are eroded by increased perceived inequality. It is a cumbersome task for researchers to
capture the effects of perceived inequality. This study argues, however, that perception of
inequality is mainly made by socio-economic benchmarking. Therefore, a more refined
measure of reference-specific inequality, for example, the distribution of income within
distinct groups of similar age and education, brings us one step closer to capturing the
impact of perceived inequality. In this study, age-specific measures of income inequality
are applied in order to better explain patterns of generalized trust.
2.6 The Problem of Mutual Dependence
When discussing plausible determinants of trust, quickly, the question about mutual effects
becomes apparent. In some cases, the direction of cause and effect is debatable. Many
scholars argue that civic engagement or economic growth is fostered by generalized trust,
though one could easily argue that a working civil society and economic prosperity lay the
ground for people trusting each other. In fact, for the case of civic participation and
generalized trust, an ongoing reciprocative relation has become the consensus in the lit-
erature (van Ingen and Bekkers 2015). For other features, however, it is much more
plausible to argue for a one-sided direction of influence. For the example of religious
opinions, it might be true that our denomination has an impact on how much we trust each
other, while it is hard to imagine an effect in the opposite direction. The present investi-
gation is based on the assumption that trust is partly determined by income inequality and
the perception of it. Still, future investigations shall be encouraged to include a temporal
components so as to allow more determined statements about the cause and effect of
generalized trust.
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3 Data
In order to assess the influence of income inequalities on individual (generalized) trust, two
datasets are employed; the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC) and the European Social Survey (ESS 5) of 2010.
The EU-SILC micro data provides us with the information of the monthly gross
household income on 32.377 households in 30 European countries. Additionally, the age
and educational attainment of the person providing the households accommodation is
reported. With the use of the Gini formula derived by Milanovic (1997), age-specific Gini
coefficients are calculated for each country. In Fig. 1 the Gini coefficients of our calcu-
lations are plotted against the official 2010 net income inequality measures issued by the
Luxembourg Income Study database, the OECD and the Worldbank.
The figure supports the reliability of the EU-SILC income data by comparing the
calculated country Ginis to official inequality measures. In a later stage, age-specific Gini
coefficients are added to the ESS 5 data set. Here, a measure of generalized trust emerges
from the survey question phrased ‘‘...generally speaking, would you say that most people
can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’’, with a response
scale from 0 (‘‘You can’t be too careful’’) to 10 (‘‘Most people can be trusted’’). Lastly, the
ESS 5 supplies us with the individual’s age, other personal characteristics (sex, marital and
employment status, level of education etc.) as additional control variables. All applied
variables are summarized in Table 1.
4 Method
The method of this work can be basically drawn in three distinct steps. First, age group
measures of income inequality are calculated. Then second, with the use of a mixed effect
hierarchical ordered logit model with country and age clusters, levels of generalized trust
are explained by country Ginis and age-specific Ginis. Individual covariates are choosen
Fig. 1 Gini versus own calculations: the official inequality measures and own calculations of Gini coincide.
Source EU-SILC 2009, ESS 5, and own calculations
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according to the reasoning of selected previous investigations. Possible influences on how
much people trust each other have been discussed widely in the socio-economic literature
in the last 15 years. Six of the most cited investigations on trust3 with multilevel models
serve as a pool for the selection of micro-level characteristics. Some features have been
used more frequently than others and studies differ in their regional focus and applied
metric. Lastly, standard income inequality and age-specific income inequality are cotrasted
with respect to their effects on generalized trust.
4.1 Income Inequality by Age
The key measure of this analysis is an age-specific Gini coefficient. The coefficient is
calculated for each age, taking into consideration individuals within an 11-year age-span
(individuals 5 years younger and 5 years older than the reference age). In this context
several smaller age-spans (3, 5, 7, 9 years) have been tested—with no significant change of
results. Results lose significance once a 1-year-span is chosen.4 A formula often advocated
for its easy applicability is used (Milanovic 1997):
Table 1 Summary of characteristics: model variables are distributed on a national (macro), age-specific
(mezzo), and individual (micro) level. Source EU-SILC 2009, ESS 5, and own calculations
Variable Observations Mean/average Max Min
National Gini 22 0.339 0.390 0.261
Age group Gini 1429 0.327 0.411 0.237
[0–10] Generalized trust 22,089 4.89 10 0
[0/1] Gender: male 22,089 49.20 % – –
Age 22,089 49.77 81 17
Years of education 22,089 12.26 45 0
Work status
Paid work 22,089 40.0 % – –
Education 22,089 10.7 % – –
Unemployed 22,089 7.5 % – –
Retired 22,089 3.3 % – –
Housework 22,089 4.7 % – –
Other 22,089 4.2 % – –
Marital status
Married/civil union 22,089 40.5 % – –
Separated/divorced 22,089 10.3 % – –
Widowed 22,089 10.4 % – –
Never married 22,089 38.8 % – –
Children living at home 22,089 51.6 % – –
Born in country 22,089 92.6 % – –
3 Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), Marschall and Stolle (2004), Leigh (2006a, b), Rothstein and Stolle (2008)
and Hooghe et al. (2009).
4 For a descriptive analysis, education in addition to age is taken into account. This measure, however, is
not applied in the inferential investigation, since the sample populations by age and education are too small
for several countries. For the calculation of the age-education-specific Gini, only individuals within the same
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Ga ¼ 1ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p rya
la
qðya; ryaÞ;
a ¼ 18; . . .80
ð1Þ
Here, Ga the stands for the Gini index of individuals of age a. qðya; ryaÞ is the covariance
between income ya and the rank of all individuals according to their income rya within one
age group. rya denotes the variance of income in one group and la the mean income in this
age group. For instance, the age-specific Gini G30 would refer to the income inequality of
all individuals aged between 25 and 35 in one county. For the less complex case, only
groups of similar age are considered as basis for the calculation. Table 2 compares the
national Gini with the age-specific Ginis. The correlation coefficient between the country-
and the age-specific Ginis of 0.65 is more than moderate butl not large enough to assume
identity of the two measures.
4.2 Explaining Trust
The model for the examination of the reference-specific linkage between income inequality
and generalized trust can be described in the following way:
PðTrusti¼TrustjxÞ¼ac;aþacþbc Ginicþdc;a AgeGinic;aþcc;a;i Individualsc;a;iþc;a;i
ð2Þ
Trust, measured on a scale from 0 to 10 on the individual (i) level is explained by the
AgeGini coefficient, specific for each age group (a). In addition, the national Gini, on a
country level (c) is taken into account. Since the dependent variable is ordinal and indi-
vidual characteristics are nested within age groups which are again nested within countries,
a hierarchical model structure is applied. Figure 2 illustrates the structure of the model
with its micro-, mezzo- and macro-level.
As explained in the previous paragraph, in this way, country-specific and age-specific
fixed effects are allowed. The age-specific Gini model is compared with a baseline model
containing the national Gini. At the last model stage, the interaction of both Ginis is
considered.
4.3 Model Specification
Figure 3 responses to the generalized trust question are displayed in histograms per
country. The distribution of the trust outcome in general appears to be well captured with a
logit distribution.
For most countries patterns of trust are almost symmetrically distributed, but with thick
tails. Therefore the applied model with an ordinal outcome assumes a logit distribution.
Secondly, it can be noticed that the shape of the distribution varies significantly across
countries. We can observe a left shift of the distribution in low trust countries like Bulgaria
and Cyprus, a symmetric distribution in countries like Germany and Lithuania, and a right-
skewed pattern in high trust countries like Norway and Denmark. In the model, country
fixed effects are considered in order to ensure a more precise estimation. With regard to the
Footnote 4 continued
age group and with a similar level of educational attainment (ISCED 0–1, ISCED 2, ISCED 3, and ISCED
4–5) are considered.
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Table 2 Country characteristics:
for 22 European countries,
national and age-specific Ginis
are compared. Source EU-SILC
2009, ESS 5, and own
calculations
Some countries show a sizeable
variance in inequalities across
age groups
Country Observations National Gini Age group Gini
Min Mean Max
NO 849 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.29
NL 1057 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.29
DK 902 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.29
SE 901 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.32
HU 787 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.31
SI 476 0.31 0.25 0.31 0.37
CZ 1282 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.33
FR 992 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.34
SK 793 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.35
EE 936 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.34
BE 913 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.35
DE 1870 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.35
PL 712 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.36
CH 838 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.36
IE 1383 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.38
ES 947 0.35 0.32 0.34 0.36
UK 1317 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.40
CY 494 0.38 0.35 0.37 0.40
GR 1415 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.40
BG 1314 0.39 0.34 0.39 0.41
LT 739 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.40
PT 1172 0.39 0.35 0.39 0.41
Fig. 2 Illustration of model: the three-dimnesional model segregates the sample into macro- (countries),
mezzo- (age groups), and micro-levels (individuals), which are nested within each other. Source EU-SILC
2009, ESS 5, and own calculations
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structure and distribution of the data, a hierarchical generalized linear ordinal logit model
with an assumed logit distribution of trust is applied.5
Having specified the selection of the model structure according to the distribution of the
outcome variable, careful attention is drawn to the selection of valid aggregated and
individual characteristics explaining trust. The discussion about possible explanatory
factors on a theoretical ground is necessary in order to build a reliable model environment.
However, conceptual considerations could become arbitrary if not validated with a sound
selection procedure. The limited sample size of 22 countries does not allow for any further
first level controls, but national Gini. All controls described in the following, which have
been chosen by theoretical reflection in previous works (Steijn and Lancee 2011; Leigh
2006b; Uslaner and Brown 2005; Alesina et al. 2004), are evaluated on the basis of their
explanatory power. Table 3 summarized these works.
On an individual level, a collection of commonly mentioned indicators is conducted. All
controls, which have been used at least twice in previous contributions are selected, if
available in the ESS dataset. The final list includes namely: age, gender, years of educa-
tion, employment status, marital status, having children, and born in the country.
5 Results
5.1 Inequality by Age
Socio-economic referencing has been shown to transmit between inequality and trust. The
application of measures of inequality on a national level overlooks income imbalances
within certain social groups. It is imparative to examine subnational inequality in order to
better understand the link between inequality and trust. This analysis fragments society by
age and creates Gini coefficients for 11 years age spans from the ages of 18–80. Figure 4
illustrates the age group Ginis for the example of three countries with different levels of
national income inequality, namely Sweden (low inequality), Germany (medium
inequality), and Bulgaria (high inequality).
Even though the national level of Gini is significantly different across all three coun-
tries, age specific measures reveal how disperse income inequality is within the socities.
Starting with a low inequality example, Sweden, it can be noticed that income imbalances
increase with age for the first 10 years of the sample populatiopn. Imbalances remain fairly
stable and peak again for the ten last age groups. The lowest age group gini in Sweden is
0.255 and the highest level at 0.33. Sweden’s highest level of age-specific inequality
almost reaches the lowest values of the German age group inequality. Here, income
inequality, on the other hand, develops relatively stable across ages. Imbalances peak
slightly around the age of 57. Bulgaria, lastly, shows by far the largest variance in
inequality. For early ages, the levels of Gini still lie around the German national average of
0.34. However, across age, inequality increases starkly and reaches its highest value for the
last age group with a value of 0.41. The first results indicate that age-specific income
inequality is not necessarly reflected by national measures. If referencing based on socio-
economic characteristics, like age, is an important determinant of generalized trust, age-
5 The statistical software STATA MP 13 employs the meglm command for multilevel mixed-effects gen-
eralized linear models. The model commands for distribution and link are choosen as famliy(ordinal) and
link(logit).
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specific measures of inequality need to be considered for the analysis of the inequality-
trust-linkage.
5.2 Patterns Across Age and Education
In addition to age, the socio-economic reference group can be further defined by education.
Figures 5 and 6 display different measures of income inequality for 21 European
countries.6
The graphical display is structured as followed from top to bottom. First, the country
level Gini is shown. Secondly, in the middle of the graph, distributions of age-specific Gini
coefficients (age span of 11 years) are display. In the lowest part of the graph, the dis-
tribution of age- and education-specific Ginis is depicted. It is important to notice that the
third part does not just separate the information of the middle section by educational
attainment. The measures of inequality, in the lowest part, are calculated from different
populations. Here, only individuals within one age and educational group are considered.
Figure 6 relies on the same information as Fig. 5, but countries are ordered by national
level trust instead of national Gini. In general, it can be noticed that countries with a low
level of national trust, like Bulgaria, Portugal and Cyprus, have a high level of general and
age-education-specific inequality. While high trust countries like Sweden, Norway, Den-
mark or the Netherlands, show low levels of reference-specific inequality on the other side.
The positive association between age-specific inequality and national inequality is
indicated by the upward trend of the distributions’ means with higher level of national
Gini. Additionally, it can be noticed that the variance of age-specific inequality is higher
for countries of high national inequality. An exception, in terms of variation of inequality,
is Sweden, where variation in age-education-specific Ginis in the first two educational
groups is large, though the level of national inequality is low. Since economic bench-
marking within groups of similar age and education is suspected to play an important role
Fig. 4 Age group Ginis for three selected countries: the example of Sweden, Germany, and Bulgaria shows
that age-specific imbalances remain undetected by national measures of inequality. Source EU-SILC 2009,
ESS 5, and own calculations
6 The sample size for Luxembourg is too small in order to perform the fragmentation with education.
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Table 4 Generalized Trust Explained by Inequality: trust is negatively associated with both national and
age group inequality Source EU-SILC 2009, ESS 5, and own calculations
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
[0–10] Generalized trust
Country Gini -12.17*** -10.41*** -1.16
(0.57) (0.42) (1.51)
Age group Gini -1.16*** -0.41** 2.53
(0.21) (0.23) (1.63)
Country Gini 9 age group Gini -8.37*
(4.65)
Age -0.02*** -0.01 -0.01** -0.01**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age2: 1000 0.23*** 0.12** 0.18*** 0.17***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
[0/1] Gender: male 0.05** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Years of full-time education completed 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Work status (ref. employed)
In education 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.19***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Unemployed -0.24*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.20***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Retired -0.14*** -0.11** -0.13*** -0.13***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Housework -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Other (sick, community service, etc.) -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.22***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Marital status (ref. Married/Legal Union)
Separated/divorced -0.10** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Widowed -0.09** -0.08* -0.10** -0.09*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Never married -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
[0/1] Ever had children living in household -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
[0/1] Born in country 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.10** 0.11**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Countries 22 22 22 22
Age groups 1429 1429 1429 1429
Individuals 22,089 22,089 22,089 22,089
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for mutual confidence, this surprisingly rich spectrum of socio-specific inequality needs to
be considered.
The significant within-country variation of income inequality is not captured the
national inequality measure in the first row. While Scandinavians are—as expected—
societies with low income imbalances, countries like Greece, Bulgaria and Portugal appear
to have relatively skewed income distributions. With the introduction of age- and educa-
tion-specific Gini coefficients, additional patterns of income inequality emerge. At first
sight, sizable difference in the age-specific imbalances the within countries and across
education levels are present. As an example, in the Netherlands, a country with egalitarian
roots and known for its low level of average inequality, age-specific Ginis decrease with
level of education. In Portugal, the country with the sample’s highest level of general
inequality, age-specific imbalances seem to increase with educational class. Societies like
Germany or Poland, middle-ranked in Europe’s score of income inequalities, do not show
any distinct differences in age-specific inequality across education. Another interesting
case is the example of Lithuania. Looking at Fig. 6 in which countries are ordered by trust,
the Baltic society seems to stick out of the average pattern with a relatively high level of
general inequality. Though, the split-up by age and education shows that high levels of
country inequality are mainly driven by income imbalances in the lowest educational
groups.
5.3 Which Inequality Really Matters?
As seen previously, high income inequality is associated with low levels of trust. But does
inequality hinder trust? The relationship is sketched by two concepts, stratification and
perception. For evaluating the perception effect of inequality it is argued that age and
education could be interpreted as the lowest common. Table 4 exhibits the effects of the
various Ginis (and their interaction) on trust, while all mentioned controls are applied.
In column (1), the national Gini shows a strong negative association with trust, as
expected in accordance with the literature. All individual controls show results, which a
similar to previous investigations. Generalized trust decreases with age and increases with
education. While man are more trusting than women, on average, individuals in education
and with stable employment and partnerships likewise show higher levels of confidence.
The same is true for native nationals. In model (2), national Gini is substituted by age-
specific Gini. Overall, the results are similar. Age-specific inequality is likewise negatively
associated with generalized trust. When both measures of inequality are taken into account
in model (3), age-specific inequalities still show a negative association with generalized
trust. The within country variation of income inequality and influence on trust is not
captured by national Ginis alone. In model (4) lastly, the interaction between national and
age-specific Gini is examined. Here, both measures seem to reinforce each other.
Table 4 continued
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
[0–10] Generalized trust
AIC 4.295 4.294 4.291 4.291
Model precision increases with the application of age-specific measures
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
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Generalized trust is significantly lower where both national and age-specific inequality is
high. Comparing the model lines, AIC indicates that model accuracy can be improved with
the use of the age-specific Gini measurement.
6 Conclusion
As seen in previous contributions, high income inequality is associated with low levels of
trust. But does the concept of national income distribution convincingly describe the
essence of why inequality hinders trust? The relationship is sketched by two concepts,
stratification and perception. The economic stratification of society leads to the emergence
of distinct spheres of everyday life. Segregated housing and income-dependent school
systems are vivid examples of how inequality can diminish the ground of common trust
building. The argument of perception, based on subjective believes, is more difficult to
illustrate. On the one hand, it is less likely to keep up a relationship, rich in trust, with
others of who we think to share only little similarities. On the other hand, it is the believe
that society is marked by unrightful differences which diminishes our faith in one another.
Previous studies have claimed to capture the effects of both stratification and perception
with the use of one inequality indicator. Though, if one believes that the comparison with
others is key to understand how inequality influences trust, the concept of economic
reference groups should be described accordingly. Instead to comparing one’s own eco-
nomic well-being to the rest of the society, it is much more likely, that we chose a
reference group to which a meaningful comparison is possible, in the first place. For an
evaluation of the perception effect of inequality, ‘‘our family Jones’’, to use the term of
social class benchmarking, still needs to be defined. In the analyzed case, it is argued that
age and education could be interpreted as the lowest common. The findings rather support
age as a reference criterion. The results have four main indications. First, inequality in
general diminishes mutual confidence. Second, both low and high inequality countries
inherit sizeable age-specific income imbalances. Third, empirical results suggest that the
concept of age-specific inequality enriches the theory of economic imbalances as a treat to
generalized trust. In interaction with general imbalances, age-specific inequality reinforces
effects of trust. Where ever age-specific inequality is high, levels of trust are even lower if
general inequality is high too.
6.1 The Inequality Within Inequality
The common conclusion of previous works that high inequality is accompanied by low
levels of trust is supported. Indeed, in contrast to previous studies skeptical about the
impact of income inequality on trust, the presented work consolidates the influence of
inequality even when regarding a large set of other economic and personal characteristics
at the same time. This finding appears to be robust, but economic stratification of society is
only one aspect of how inequality diminishes trust.
The results of this study underline that the perception of income imbalances in Europe
plays an important role in explaining generalized trust. Economic comparison with other
members of society impacts on how much we trust each other. The question to whom we
compare our standards of living is relevant and the concept of an adequate socio-economic
reference group needs to be considered. Age and education, among many other possible
characteristics, are use to build examples of socio-economic groups, within which measure
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of income inequality are calculated. The introduction of these sub-categories of inequality
has uncovered that income imbalances within European societies vary to a sizable extent
across age and educational groups. As one, of many, illustrative examples; in Sweden, a
society with low levels of national inequality, the variation of age-specific inequality is
stricingly different comparing age groups and levels of education. Differences range from
low levels of group-specific inequality around 0.2 up to values above 0.35. The fact that
socio-economic reference determines our mutual confidence underlines the importance to
consider this spread.
The results have illustrated that the aspect of social referencing matters for determining
generalized trust. Additionally we see that the boundaries of economic benchmarking are
rather set by age alone than by age and education. The large spread of age- and education-
specific income imbalances in some European countries should alert researchers as well as
policy makers, who have so far been mostly relying on ample measure of income
inequality. The results presented here show that also outside the context of inequality and
trust, a more refined depiction of within country imbalances of income is advisable. In the
specific context of trust and inequality, age-specific inequality is no substitute for actual
inequality in modeling trust, but rather a complement. In environemnts where inequality
per se is high, negative effect of socio-specific inequality on trust are even more intense.
6.2 Future Research
The presented work has underlined the negative relationship between income inequality
and generalized trust. Furthermore, it encourages researchers in this field to have a closer
look at patterns of inequality beyond the known standard aggregated measures. Age-
specific inequality is negatively associated with trust, too. Their diminishing effect on trust
might be overlooked in countries with an apparently low level of income inequality. Still
without a timing dimension, associations will not give any disclosure on causal links. Only
by following patterns of inequality and trust over time in future studies, one can find
evidence to challenge the debate about reverse causality between fragmentation and trust.
The successful application of subnational-aggregates should foster future refinements in
the analysis of generalized trust and fragmentation. Just like age-specific imbalances are
not in line with aggregates of inequality, a sizable regional variation of trust, inequality,
and other measures of fragmentation can be expected. The analysis of the inequality-trust-
linkage on a regional level is surely an valuable and promising topic of investigation.
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Appendix
Description of Data and Variables
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EUSILC UDB 2010—
version 5 of March 2014); countries covered: AT 10,318; BE 7810; BG 15,441; CH
11,826; CY 4829; CZ 11,758; DE 18,588; DK 14,499; EE 11,209; EL 9486; ES 20,814; FI
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17,863; FR 21,904; HU 13,928; IE 10,043; IS 7914; IT 24,758; LT 12,452; LU 5,754; LV
14,413; MT 6623; NL 21,038; NO 11,671; PL 19,709; PT 7513; RO 10,017; SE 10,110; SI
9364; SK 8180; UK 14,413.
European Social Survey 5 (ESS 5)—2010; countries covered: BE 1644; BG 2249; CH
1429; CY 906; CZ 2110; DE 2882; DK 1475; EE 1659; ES 1778; FR 1657; GR 2504; HU
1415; IE 2246; LT 1215; NL 1723; NO 1487; PL 1581; PT 1957; SE 1406; SI 1094; SK
1537; UK 2145.
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